In the Summer 2002 issue of the Naval War College Review, the eminent historian Richard Kohn lamented the state of civil-military relations, writing that it was "extraordinarily poor, in many respects as low as in any period of American peacetime history." The article was based on the keynote address that Professor Kohn had delivered as part of a Naval War College conference on civil-military relations in the spring of 1999. Accordingly, the focus of attention was on problems that had bedeviled the Clinton administration.

Some of the most highly publicized of these civil-military problems reflected cultural tensions between the military as an institution and liberal civilian society, mostly having to do with women in combat and open homosexuals in the military. The catalogue included "Tailhook," the Kelly Flinn affair, the sexual harassment scandal at Aberdeen, Maryland, and the very public exchange regarding homosexuals between newly elected President Bill Clinton on the one hand and the uniformed military and Congress on the other.

Other examples of civil-military tensions included the charge that Gen. Colin Powell, then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was illegitimately invading civilian turf by publicly advancing opinions on foreign policy. During the 1992 presidential campaign, Powell published a piece in the New York Times warning about the dangers of intervening in Bosnia. Not long afterward, he followed up with an article in Foreign Affairs that many criticized as an illegitimate attempt by

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a senior military officer to preempt the foreign policy agenda of an incoming president. Critics argued that Powell’s actions constituted a serious encroachment by the military on civilian “turf.” They argued that it was unprecedented for the highest-ranking officer on active duty to go public with his disagreements with the president over foreign policy and the role of the military.

Closely related to the contention that the military had illegitimately expanded its influence into an inappropriate area was the claim that the U.S. military had, in response to the supposed lessons of Vietnam, succeeded in making military, not political, considerations paramount in the political-military decision-making process—dictating to civilians not only how its operations would be conducted but also the circumstances under which it would be used. This role reflected the post-Vietnam view dominant within the military that only professional military officers could be trusted to establish principles guiding the use of military force.

Taking its bearings from the so-called Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, a set of rules for the use of force that had been drafted in the 1980s, the U.S. military did everything it could to avoid what came to be known (incorrectly) as “nontraditional missions”: constabulary operations required for “imperial policing”—for example, peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. The clearest example of a service’s resistance to a mission occurred when the Army, arguing that its proper focus was on preparing to fight conventional wars, insisted that the plans for U.S. interventions in Bosnia, Kosovo, and elsewhere reflect the military’s preference for “overwhelming force.” As one contemporary source reported, the military had a great deal of influence on the Dayton Agreement establishing an Implementation Force (IFOR) to enforce peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to Clinton administration officials quoted in the story, the agreement “was carefully crafted to reflect demands from the military…. Rather than be ignored . . . the military, as a price for its support, has basically gotten anything it wanted.”

Finally, there were many instances of downright hostility on the part of the military toward President Clinton, whose anti-military stance as a young man during the Vietnam War years did not endear him to soldiers. Many interpreted such hostility as just one more indication that the military had become too partisan (Republican) and politicized.

Some observers claimed that the civil-military tensions of the 1990s were a temporary phenomenon attributable to the perceived anti-military character of the Clinton administration. But civil-military tensions did not disappear with
the election and reelection of George W. Bush as president. If anything, civil-
military relations have become more strained as a result of clashes between
the uniformed services and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld over his
commitment to the president’s agenda of “transforming” the U.S. military—re-
shaping it from a heavy, industrial-age force designed to fight the USSR during
the Cold War to a more agile, information-age force capable of defeating future
adversaries anywhere in the world—and the planning and conduct of U.S. mili-
tary operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.

The actions on the part of some military officers to undercut Rumsfeld and
his policies in pursuit of their own goals—anti-Rumsfeld leaks to the press,
“foot-dragging,” “slow-rolling,” and generally what Peter Feaver has called
“shirking”—are not indicative of a “crisis” in American civil-military relations.
But they do suggest that civil-military relations are now unhealthy and out of
balance. 3

REVOLT OF THE GENERALS?
In April of this year, a number of retired Army and Marine generals publicly
called for the resignation of Secretary Rumsfeld. Much of the language they used
was intemperate, some downright contemptuous. For instance, Marine general
Anthony Zinni, Tommy Franks’s predecessor as commander of Central Com-
mand, described the actions of the Bush administration as ranging from “true
dereliction, negligence, and irresponsibility” to “lying, incompetence, and cor-
rup tion.” He called Rumsfeld “incompetent strategically, operationally, and tac-
tically.” One has to go back to 1862 to find a senior military officer, active or
retired, condemning a civilian superior so harshly in public.

Observers of what the press called the “revolt of the generals” believed that
these retired general officers were speaking on behalf of not only themselves but
many active-duty officers as well. While there are no legal restrictions that pre-
vent retired members of the military—even recently retired members—from
criticizing public policy or the individuals responsible for it, there are some im-
portant reasons to suggest that the public denunciation of civilian authority by
even retired officers undermines healthy civil-military relations.

First of all, as Kohn has observed, retired general and flag officers are ana-
logous to the cardinals of the Roman Catholic Church. As such, the public is un-
likely to distinguish between the views of retired officers and the views of those
who are still on active duty. Second, because of their status, public criticism by
retired officers may in fact encourage active-duty officers to engage in the sort of
behavior that undermines healthy civil-military relations, signaling to them that
it is acceptable, for instance, to undercut policy by leaks to the press and other
methods of “shirking.” Finally, such actions on the part of retired officers may
convince active-duty officers that, by virtue of their uniforms, the latter are en-
titled to “insist” that civilian authorities accept the military’s policy prescrip-
tions. The implied threat here is mass resignation, which, as we shall see later, is foreign
to the American military tradition.

The central charges in the case against Secretary Rumsfeld include willfully
ignoring military advice and initiating the war in Iraq with a force that was too
small, failing to adapt to the new circumstances once things began to go wrong,
failing to foresee the insurgency that now rages in that country, and ignoring the
need to prepare for postconflict stability operations.

Criticism of Rumsfeld by uniformed officers is predicated on two assump-
tions. The first is that soldiers have a right to a voice in making policy regarding
the use of the military instrument, that indeed they have the right to insist that
their views be adopted. The second is that the judgment of soldiers is inherently
superior to that of civilians when it comes to military affairs. In time of war, ci-
vilians should defer to military expertise. Both of these assumptions are ques-
tionable at best and are at odds with the principles and practice of American
civil-military relations.

First, in the American system, the uniformed military does not possess a veto
over policy. Indeed, civilians have the authority to make decisions even in what
would seem purely military affairs. In practice, as Eliot Cohen has shown, Amer-
ican civil-military relations do not actually conform to what some have dubbed
the “normal theory of civil-military relations,” which holds that civilians deter-
mine the goals of war and leave the strategy and execution of the war to the uni-
formed military. Cohen illustrates in Supreme Command that such successful
wartime presidents as Abraham Lincoln and Franklin Roosevelt “interfered” ex-
tensively with military operations—often driving their generals to distraction.

Second, when it comes to military affairs, soldiers are not necessarily more
prescient than civilian policy makers. This is confirmed by the historical record.
During the American Civil War, Abraham Lincoln constantly prodded George
McClellan, commanding general of the largest Union force during the Civil War,
the Army of the Potomac, to take the offensive in Virginia in 1862. McClellan
just as constantly whined that he had insufficient troops. During World War II,
notwithstanding the image of civil-military comity, there were many differences
between Franklin Roosevelt and his military advisers. Gen. George Marshall,
chief of staff of the U.S. Army and the greatest soldier-statesman since Washing-
ton, opposed arms shipments to Great Britain in 1940 and argued for a
cross-channel invasion before the United States was ready. History has vindic-
tated Lincoln and Roosevelt.

Many are inclined to blame the U.S. defeat in Vietnam on civilians. But the
American operational approach in Vietnam was the creature of the uniformed
military. The generally accepted view today is that the operational strategy of Gen. William Westmoreland (commanding the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam) emphasizing attrition of the People’s Army of Vietnam forces in a “war of the big battalions”—a concept producing sweeps through remote jungle areas in an effort to fix and destroy the enemy with superior firepower—was counterproductive. By the time Westmoreland’s successor could adopt a more fruitful approach, it was too late.¹

During the planning for Operation DESERT STORM in late 1990 and early 1991, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, commander of U.S. Central Command, presented a plan calling for a frontal assault against Iraqi positions in southern Kuwait, followed by a drive toward Kuwait City. The problem was that this plan would have been unlikely to achieve the foremost military objective of the ground war—the destruction of the three divisions of Saddam’s Republican Guard. The civilian leadership rejected the early war plan presented by CentCom and ordered a return to the drawing board. The revised plan was far more imaginative and effective.⁷

“PUSHING BACK” AND CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS
The cornerstone of U.S. civil-military relations is civilian control of the military, a principle that goes back to the American Revolution and the precedent established by George Washington, who willingly subordinated himself and his army to civilian authority. “Washington’s willing subordination, of himself and the army he commanded, to civilian authority established the essential tenet of that service’s professional ethos. His extraordinary understanding of the fundamental importance of civil preeminence allowed a professional military force to begin to flourish in a democratic society. All of our military services are heir to that legacy.”⁸

The very public attack on Rumsfeld by retired officers flies in the face of the American tradition of civilian control of the military. Should active-duty and retired officers of the Army and Navy in 1941 have debated publicly the Lend-Lease program or the occupation of Iceland? Should Douglas MacArthur have resigned over the Europe-first strategy? Should generals in 1861 have discussed in public their opinions of Lincoln’s plan to reprovision Fort Sumter, aired their views regarding the right of the South to secede from the Union, or argued the pros and cons of issuing the Emancipation Proclamation?

In support of their actions, many of Rumsfeld’s critics have invoked a very important book by H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Lies That Led to Vietnam, the subject of which is the failure of the Joint Chiefs to challenge Defense Secretary Robert McNamara forcefully enough during the Vietnam War.⁹ Many serving officers
believe the book effectively makes the case that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should have more openly voiced their opposition to the Johnson administration’s strategy of gradualism and then resigned rather than carry out the policy.

But as Kohn—who was McMaster’s academic adviser for the dissertation that became Dereliction of Duty—has observed, the book neither says nor implies that the chiefs should have obstructed American policy in Vietnam in any other way than by presenting their views frankly and forcefully to their civilian superiors, and speaking honestly to Congress when asked for their views. It neither states nor suggests that the chiefs should have opposed President Lyndon Johnson’s orders and policies by leaks, public statements, or by resignation, unless an officer personally and professionally could not stand, morally and ethically, to carry out the chosen policy.10

This serious misreading of Dereliction of Duty has dangerously reinforced the increasingly widespread belief among officers that they should be advocates of particular policies rather than contenting themselves with their traditional advisory role.

Kohn writes that a survey of officer and civilian attitudes and opinions undertaken by the Triangle Institute for Security Studies in 1998–99 discovered that “many officers believe that they have the duty to force their own views on civilian decision makers when the United States is contemplating committing American forces abroad.” When “asked whether military leaders should be neutral, advise, advocate, or insist on having their way in the decision process” to use military force, 50 percent or more of the up-and-coming active-duty officers answered “insist,” on the following issues: “setting rules of engagement, ensuring that clear political and military goals exist, developing an ‘exit strategy,’” and “deciding what kinds of military units will be used to accomplish all tasks.” In the context of the questionnaire, “insist” definitely implied that officers should try to compel acceptance of the military’s recommendations.11

Ironically, some journalists who normally would reject the idea that military officers should “insist” that elected officials or their constitutional appointees adopt the military position seem to be all for it when it comes to the Bush administration and Donald Rumsfeld. For instance, in a March 2005 column for the Washington Post handicapping the field of possible successors to Air Force general Richard B. Myers as chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, David Ignatius, citing Dereliction of Duty, raised a central question of U.S. civil-military relations: To
what extent should the uniformed military “push back” against the policies of a president and his secretary of defense if the soldiers believe the policies are wrong? Ignatius wrote that “when you ask military officers who should get the job, the first thing many say is that the military needs someone who can stand up to . . . Rumsfeld. The tension between Rumsfeld and the uniformed military,” he continued, “has been an open secret in Washington these past four years. It was compounded by the Iraq war, but it began almost from the moment Rumsfeld took over at the Pentagon. The grumbling about his leadership partly reflected the military’s resistance to change and its reluctance to challenge a brilliant but headstrong civilian leader. But in Iraq, Rumsfeld has pushed the services—especially the Army—near the breaking point.”

“The military is right,” concluded Ignatius. “The next chairman of the JCS must be someone who can push back.” But what does “pushing back” by the uniformed military mean for civilian control of the military?

LINCOLN AND MCCLELLAN: A CASE OF “PUSHING BACK”

Perhaps the clearest example of an American general who “pushed back” against civilian leadership because he disapproved of administration policy is Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan. Military historians tend to treat McClellan as a first-rate organizer, equiper, and trainer but an incompetent general who was constantly outfought and outgeneraled by his Confederate counterpart, Robert E. Lee. That may be true, but there is more to the story. McClellan and many of his favored subordinates disagreed with many of Lincoln’s policies and indeed may have attempted to sabotage them. McClellan pursued the war he wanted to fight—one that would end in a negotiated peace—rather than the one his commander in chief wanted him to fight. The behavior of McClellan and his subordinates ultimately led Lincoln to worry that his decision to issue the Emancipation Proclamation might trigger a military coup.

There is perhaps no more remarkable document in the annals of American civil–military relations than the letter McClellan gave to Lincoln when the president visited the Army of the Potomac at Harrison’s Landing on the James River in July 1862. McClellan, who had been within the sound of Richmond’s church bells only two weeks earlier, had been driven back by Lee in a series of battles known as the Seven Days. McClellan’s letter went far beyond the description of the state of military affairs that McClellan had led Lincoln to expect. Instead, McClellan argued against confiscation of rebel property and interference with the institution of slavery. “A system of policy thus constitutional and conservative, and pervaded by the influences of Christianity and freedom, would receive the support of almost all truly loyal men, would deeply impress the rebel masses and all foreign nations, and it might be humbly hoped that it would commend
itself to the favor of the Almighty.” McClellan continued that victory was possible only if the president was pledged to such a policy. “A declaration of radical views, especially upon slavery, will rapidly disintegrate our present Armies,” making further recruitment “almost hopeless.”

Advice from a general, however inappropriate, is one thing. But for a general to act on his own without consulting his commander in chief smacks of insubordination. In early June 1862, while the Army of the Potomac was still moving toward Richmond, McClellan had designated his aide, Col. Thomas Key, to represent him in prisoner-of-war negotiations with the Confederates, represented by Howell Cobb. But McClellan had gone far beyond the technical issue at hand, authorizing Key to investigate the possibility of peace between the sections. In response to Cobb’s assertion that Southern rights could be protected only by independence, Key replied that “the President, the army, and the people” had no thought of subjugating the South but only desired to uphold the Constitution and enforce the laws equally in the states. McClellan apparently thought it was part of his duty to negotiate with the enemy on the terms for ending hostilities and to explain to that enemy the policies and objectives of his commander in chief, without letting the latter know that he was doing so.

McClellan did not try to hide his efforts at peace negotiations from Lincoln. Indeed, he filed Key’s report with Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton and asked him to give it to the president. Stanton acceded to McClellan’s request but reminded him that “it is not deemed proper for officers bearing flags of truce in respect to the exchange of prisoners to hold any conference with the rebel officers upon the general subject of the existing contest.”

As for his own proper responsibilities, McClellan’s generalship was characterized by a notable lack of aggressiveness. He was accused of tarrying when Gen. John Pope’s Army of Virginia was being handled very roughly by Lee at Second Manassas. Indeed, one of Pope’s corps commanders, Fitz-John Porter, clearly serving as a surrogate for McClellan, was court-martialed for alleged failure to come to Pope’s aid quickly enough. A month later, McClellan was accused of letting Lee slip away to fight another day after Antietam; soon thereafter, Lincoln relieved him.

I have come to believe that McClellan’s lack of aggressiveness was the result not of incompetence but of his refusal to fight the war Lincoln wanted him to fight. He disagreed with Lincoln’s war aims and, in the words of Peter Feaver, “shirked” by “dragging his feet.” At the same time, McClellan and some of his officers did not hide their disdain for Lincoln and Stanton and often expressed this disdain in intemperate language. McClellan wrote his wife, “I have commenced receiving letters from the North urging me to march on Washington & assume the Govt!!” He also wrote her about the possibility of a “coup,” after
which “everything will be changed in this country so far as we are concerned &
my enemies will be at my feet.”17 He did not limit the expression of such senti-
ments to private correspondence with his wife. Lincoln and his cabinet were
aware of the rumors that McClellan intended to put “his sword across the gov-
ernment’s policy.” McClellan’s quartermaster general, Montgomery Meigs, ex-
pressed concern about “officers of rank” in the Army of the Potomac who spoke
openly of “a march on Washington to ‘clear out those fellows.’”18

Such loose talk did not help McClellan or his army in the eyes of Lincoln, who
understood that he must take action in order to remind the army of his constitu-
tional role. He did by disciplining Maj. John Key, aide de camp to the general in
chief, Henry Halleck, and brother of McClellan’s aide, the aforementioned Col.
Thomas Key. Lincoln wrote Major Key of learning that he had said in response to
a query from a brother officer as to “why . . . the rebel army [was not] bagged im-
mediately after the battle near Sharpsburg [Antietam],” that “that is not the
game. The object is that neither army shall get much advantage of the other; that
both shall be kept in the field till they are exhausted, when we will make a com-
promise and save slavery.”19

Lincoln dismissed Key from the service, despite pleas for leniency (and the
fact that Key’s son had been killed at Perryville), writing that “it is wholly inad-
missible for any gentleman holding a military commission from the United
States to utter such sentiments as Major Key is within [i.e., by an enclosure]
proved to have done.” He remarked to John Hay “that if there was a ‘game’ ever
among Union men, to have our army not take an advantage of the enemy when it
could, it was his object to break up that game.” At last recognizing the danger of
such loose talk on the part of his officers and soldiers, McClellan issued a general
order calling for the subordination of the military to civil authority: “The rem-
edy for political errors, if any are committed, is to be found only in the action of
the people at the polls.”20

On the surface, criticism of Bush administration policy by retired officers is
not nearly as serious as the actions of McClellan, whose “foot-dragging” and
“slow-rolling” undermined the Union war effort during the War of the Rebel-
lion. Nonetheless, the threat to healthy civil-military relations posed by the re-
cent, seemingly coordinated public attack by retired generals on Secretary
Rumsfeld and Bush’s Iraq policy is serious, reinforcing as it does the illegitimate
belief among active duty officers that they have the right to “insist” on their pre-
ferred options and that they have a right to “push back” against civilian
authority.

But the fact is that the soldier’s view, no matter how experienced in military
affairs the soldier may be, is still restricted to the conduct of operations and mili-
tary strategy, and even here, as Cohen shows, the civilian leadership still reserves
the right to “interfere.” Civilian control of the military means at a minimum that it is the role of the statesman to take the broader view, deciding when political considerations take precedence over even the most pressing military matters. The soldier is a fighter and an adviser, not a policy maker. In the American system, only the people at large—not the military—are permitted to punish an administration for even “grievous errors” in the conduct of war.

RUMSFELD VS. HIS CRITICS: THE RECORD

While the military must make its point strongly in the councils of government, it will not, as instances adduced above have shown, always be correct when it comes to policy recommendations. In the case of Rumsfeld, it seems clear that although he has made some critical mistakes, no one did better when it came to predicting what would transpire. Did Rumsfeld foresee the insurgency and the shift from conventional to guerrilla war? No, but neither did his critics in the uniformed services.

Indeed, Tom Ricks reported in the 25 December 2004 *Washington Post* that Maj. Isaiah Wilson III, who served as an official historian of the campaign and later as a war planner in Iraq, placed the blame for failing to foresee the insurgency squarely on the Army.21 Ricks wrote:

Many in the Army have blamed Defense Secretary Donald H. Rumsfeld and other top Pentagon civilians for the unexpectedly difficult occupation of Iraq, but Wilson reserves his toughest criticism for Army commanders who, he concludes, failed to grasp the strategic situation in Iraq and so did not plan properly for victory. He concludes that those who planned the war suffered from “stunted learning and a reluctance to adapt.”

Army commanders still misunderstand the strategic problem they face and therefore are still pursuing a flawed approach, writes Wilson, who is scheduled to teach at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point next year. “Plainly stated, the ‘western coalition’ failed, and continues to fail, to see Operation IRAQI FREEDOM in its fullness,” he asserts.

“Reluctance in even defining the situation . . . is perhaps the most telling indicator of a collective cognitive dissonance on part of the U.S. Army to recognize a war of rebellion, a people’s war, even when they were fighting it,” he comments.

What about the charge that Rumsfeld’s Pentagon shortchanged the troops in Iraq by failing to provide them with armored “humvees”?* A review of Army budget submissions makes it clear that the service’s priority, as is usually the case with the uniformed services, was to acquire “big ticket” items. It was only after the

* The “humvee”—as the HMMWV, or High-Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle, or M998 truck, in some eleven variants, is familiarly known—replaced the jeep in the U.S. military.
insurgency and the “improvised explosive device” threat became apparent that the Army began to push for supplemental spending to “up-armor” the utility vehicles.

Also, while it is true that Rumsfeld downplayed the need to prepare for postconflict stability operations, it is also the case that in doing so he was merely ratifying the preferences of the uniformed military. When it comes to postconflict stability operations, the real villain is the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine, a set of principles long internalized by the U.S. military that emphasizes the requirement for an “exit strategy.” But if generals are thinking about an exit strategy they are not thinking about “war termination”—how to convert military success into political success. This cultural aversion to conducting stability operations is reflected by the fact that operational planning for Operation IRAQI FREEDOM took eighteen months, while planning for postwar stabilization began (halfheartedly) only a couple of months before the invasion.11

In retrospect, it is easy to criticize Rumsfeld for pushing the CentCom commander, General Franks, to develop a plan based on a smaller force than the one called for in earlier plans, as well as for his interference with the Time-Phased Force and Deployment List (TPFDL) that lays out the schedule of forces deploying to a theater of war. But hindsight is always twenty/twenty, permitting us to judge another’s actions on the basis of what we know now, not what we knew then. Thus the consequences of the chosen path—to attack earlier with a smaller force—are visible to us in retrospect, while the very real risks associated with an alternative option—such as to take the time to build up a larger force, perhaps losing the opportunity to achieve surprise—remain provisional.

The debate over the size of the invasion force must also be understood in the context of civil-military relations. The fact is that Rumsfeld believed that civilian control of the military had eroded during the Clinton administration, that if the Army did not want to do something—as in the Balkans in the 1990s—it would simply overstate the force requirements. It is almost as if the standard Army response was: “The answer is 350,000 soldiers. What’s the question?” Accordingly, Rumsfeld was inclined to interpret the Army’s call for a larger force to invade Iraq as just one more example of what he perceived as foot dragging. In retrospect, Rumsfeld’s decision not to deploy the 1st Cavalry Division was a mistake, but again, he had come to believe that the TPFDL, like the “two major theater war” planning metric, had become little more than a bureaucratic tool that the services used to protect their shares of the defense budget.
It is clear that Rumsfeld is guilty of errors of judgment regarding both transformation and the conduct of the Iraq war. With regard to the former, his “business” approach to transformation is potentially risky. Rumsfeld’s approach stresses an economic concept of efficiency at the expense of military and political effectiveness. War is far more than a mere targeting drill: as the Iraq conflict has demonstrated, destruction of a “target set” may mean military success but does not translate automatically into achievement of the political goals for which the war was fought in the first place. But the U.S. military does need to transform itself, and, as suggested above, the actual practice of transformation in the Rumsfeld Pentagon has been flexible and adaptive, not doctrinaire.

With regard to the Iraq war, Rumsfeld’s original position was much more optimistic than the facts on the ground have warranted, but he has acknowledged changes in the character of the war and adapted to them. In addition, Rumsfeld’s critics have been no more prescient than he. We should not be surprised. As Clausewitz reminds us, war takes place in the realm of chance and uncertainty.

Uniformed officers have an obligation to stand up to civilian leaders if they think a policy is flawed. They must convey their concerns to civilian policy makers forcefully and truthfully. If they believe the door is closed to them at the Pentagon or the White House, they also have access to Congress. But the American tradition of civil-military relations requires that they not engage in public debate over matters of foreign policy, including the decision to go to war. Moreover, once a policy decision is made, soldiers are obligated to carry it out to the best of their ability, whether their advice is heeded or not. The idea that a general or admiral—including those on the retired list—should publicly attack government policy and its civilian authors, especially in time of war, is dangerous.

NOTES

3. Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 2005). In his treatment of civil-military relations, Feaver employs “agency theory,” which was originally developed by economists to analyze the relations between a principal and an agent to whom he has delegated authority. The problem that agency theory seeks to analyze is this: given different incentives, how does a principal ensure that the agent is doing what the principal wants him to do? Is the agent “working” or “shirking”?
The major question for the principal is the extent to which he will monitor the agent. Will monitoring be intrusive or nonintrusive? This decision is affected by the cost of monitoring. The higher the cost of monitoring, the less intrusive the monitoring is likely to be. The agent’s incentives for working or shirking are affected by the likelihood that his shirking will be detected by the principal and that he will then be punished for it. The less intrusive the principal’s monitoring, the less likely the agent’s shirking will be detected.

In applying agency theory to civil-military relations, Feaver acknowledges the unsuitability of the term “shirking” when describing the action of the military agent when it pursues its own preference rather than those of the civilian principal. But he contends that the alternatives are even less suitable. Feaver argues that shirking by the military takes many forms; the most obvious form of military shirking is disobedience, but it also includes foot dragging and leaks to the press designed to undercut policy or individual policy makers.

15. Feaver, *Armed Servants*.
17. McClellan to Mary Ellen McClellan, 10 August 1862, in ibid., p. 390.